What is Able Danger, you ask? It’s a military intelligence unit that had identified Mohamed Atta and other hijackers as a threat before the 9/11 attacks. However, due to procedures established by the Clinton administration, specifically Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, Able Danger was not allowed to share its information with other intelligence agencies. In fact, Able Danger specifically requested to share its information with the FBI, but was denied. This same policy prevented the CIA from informing the FBI that two other future 9/11 hijackers had entered the United States as well.
Oddly enough, Able Danger’s information was left out of the 9/11 Commission report, despite the commission having received two briefings on the matter. Oddly enough, if you recall, Jamie Gorelick was also a member of that commission.
If I knew that a policy that I implemented impeded investigation of at least six of the hijackers that could have possibly prevented 9/11, I guess wouldn’t really be in a hurry to let that cat out of the bag, either.
UPDATE: Now that the commission is on about their fifth version of whether or not they knew about Atta, Mark Steyn gets in on the analysis:
If you want to know everything wrong with the 9/11 Commission in a single soundbite, consider this from Al Felzenberg, their official spokesperson, speaking last Wednesday:
?There was no way that Atta could have been in the United States at that time, which is why the staff didn?t give this tremendous weight when they were writing the report. This information was not meshing with the other information that we had.?
In fairness to Mr Felzenberg, he was having a bad week, and a hard time staying on top of the Commission?s ever shifting version of events. It had emerged a few days earlier that a group from Special Operations Command claimed to have fingered Mohammed Atta ? the guy who ploughed Flight 11 into the first World Trade Center tower ? well over a year before 9/11. Or as the Associated Press puts it:
?A classified military intelligence unit called ?Able Danger? identified Atta and three other hijackers in 1999 as potential members of a terrorist cell in New York City.?
When the story broke, the Commissioners denied they knew anything about ?Able Danger?. Then they remembered they had known about it but had concluded it was no big deal and ?decided not to include that in its final report.?
Why?s that? Well, as Mr Felzenberg says so disarmingly, ?this information was not meshing with the other information?. As a glimpse into the mindset of the Commission, that?s very interesting. 9/11 happened, in part, because the various Federal bureaucracies involved were unable to process information that didn?t ?mesh? with conventional wisdom. Now we find that the official commission intended to identify those problems and ensure they don?t recur is, in fact, guilty of the very same fatal flaw. The new information didn?t ?mesh? with the old information, so they disregarded it.
Kind of makes you wonder what else the commission thought was “no big deal”.
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